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I.   INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, average inflation in Latin America reached an unprecedented high of nearly 
500 percent. Three of the largest countries in the region (Argentina, Brazil, and Peru) posted 
quadruple-digit inflation rates, and no country managed to achieve a single-digit rate. In 
contrast, by that time, industrial countries had already lowered inflation to an average of 
approximately 4 percent, while Asian countries had brought it down on average to 6 percent. 
At the same time, 1990 marked the end of a 10-year period in which per capita GDP in Latin 
America fell on average 0.1 percent annually. With standards of living in decline, the region's 
governments faced the need to tackle inflation and made structural changes aimed at laying 
the foundations for a rebound in economic growth.
2 
 
Thus, central bank reform became, during the 1990s, a key component of the new economic 
agenda in most Latin American countries. The objective of the reform was to restore 
confidence in monetary policy and thereby wage a successful war on inflation. To ensure the 
credibility of the reforms, Latin American governments decided to implement the 
institutional changes in a highly visible way, by passing special laws and, in some cases, by 
amending the national constitution. As a result, up to now new central bank legislation has 
been enacted—in some cases more than once—in every country but Brazil.
3 Reforms of the 
central banks led to significant institutional strengthening and to changes in the design and 
execution of monetary policy in a majority of countries in the region. 
 
As a result of the reforms, Latin American central banks became more independent from 
their governments—to a greater degree in some countries than in others. The new legislation 
gave the central banks operational independence and prohibited their financing of the fiscal 
deficit, or at least severely restricted their ability to do so. With monetary policy 
independently managed, governments’ chances of having potential expansionary policies 
associated with a country's political-business-cycle were markedly reduced. In exchange for 
                                                 
2 Edwards (1995) provides a detailed discussion of the nature of structural reforms in Latin 
America, while Lora (2001) gives quantitative data on the progress achieved in each country 
since the mid-1980s on implementing reforms, which illustrates how the process has 
developed over time and how different countries compare to one another. 
3 Central bank reform was undertaken in Chile (1989), El Salvador (1991), Argentina (1992 
and 2002), Colombia (1992), Nicaragua (1992 and 1999), Venezuela (1992, 1999, and 2002), 
Ecuador (1992 and 1998), Peru (1993), Mexico (1993), Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), 
Uruguay (1995), Paraguay (1995), Honduras (1996 and 2004), Guatemala (2001), and the 
Dominican Republic (2002). Although Brazil did not pass legislation to bring about reforms, 
it pursued social consensus in favor of the operational independence of the central bank and 
passed a Fiscal Responsibility Law, which strengthen the central bank’s financial autonomy 
and accountability. Ecuador and El Salvador further reformed their central bank legislation in 
2000 and 2001, respectively, but this time to adopt the U.S. dollar as legal tender. - 5 - 
 
this autonomy, central banks were held accountable with respect to their policy actions and 
decisions. Within the central banks, the legal reform encouraged changes both at the policy 
level as well as in the operational framework for the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Today, most Latin American countries have guided the inflation rate to single digits, but only 
a handful of them are keeping pace with world inflation. Except for Costa Rica, the 
Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, all other countries brought inflation down to single 
digits by end-2004. However, only Chile and Peru, and the dollarized Panama and Ecuador 
have managed to make their inflation rates converge to the international rate, as measured by 
the level of inflation in the industrial countries. 
  
The main objective of this paper is to examine the nature of central banks’ reform in Latin 
America since the early 1990s, its institutional and policy implications, and the main 
challenges that they are facing today. Section II of the paper focuses on the key aspects of the 
reform of Latin American central banks and quantifies the impact of these reforms as 
measured by the degree of legal independence of central banks. Section III examines the 
impact of central bank reform on inflation—albeit without establishing causality—by 
considering the periods before and after the institutional changes were introduced. Section IV 
describes central banks' policy changes stemming from reform. Section V identifies the main 
challenges facing Latin America's central banks in light of recent regional developments. 
Finally, Section VI sets out the paper's main conclusions. 
 
II.   THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR MONETARY POLICY 
Latin America's central banks are relatively young institutions. Not only did they come into 
being more than a century after the countries achieved independence, they were established 
much later than their counterparts in Europe and even later than their counterpart in the 
United States. Except for the Banco de la República Oriental del Uruguay, which was 
established with the double role of central bank and commercial bank at the end of the 
nineteenth century, most Latin America's central banks were created in the 1920s and 1930s.
4  
 
Since central banks were established in Latin America, they have undergone various reforms, 
including the most recent adopted since the early 1990s. Along this period and up to the 
latest reform, the central bank ownership evolved from a joint public and private sector 
participation to one of exclusive state ownership. For a long time, central banks’ government 
bodies maintained a mixed representation of both public and private sectors, including in the 
latter representatives of commercial banks and producers' associations. This governance 
structure was consistent with the mandate assigned to them, which primarily focused on 
                                                 
4 The central banks of Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Bolivia, and Guatemala were all 
founded in the 1920s, whereas the central banks of Peru, Argentina, El Salvador, Costa Rica, 
and Venezuela were established in the 1930s. The central banks of Brazil and Uruguay as 
they exist today separated from other government agencies in the 1960s. - 6 - 
 
financing key sectors of the economy and promoting economic growth. The modality of 
formulation of monetary policy also changed, as governments started to play a larger role 
around the 1950s, using central banks to foster economic development. Thus, the instruments 
of monetary policy—such as credit regulation by economic activity and interest rates 
control—were aligned with the governments’ role of promoting economic activity and 
growth. As a result, until the 1990s, central banks did not operate independently from policy-
makers and therefore central banks lacked the independence to formulate and execute 
monetary and exchange rate policy, with price stability being, at most, a secondary objective. 
 
A.   The Institutional Reform since the Early 1990s 
In the 1990s, the legislation governing Latin America's central banks was extensively 
amended to make them more independent from the countries’ executive branch.
5 The 
reform implied an institutional strengthening of central banks, based on four main pillars: 
(i) defining a clear mandate for central banks, which places priority on maintaining price 
stability; (ii) giving central banks political independence to design monetary policy; 
(iii) granting central banks operational autonomy to execute monetary policy; and 
(iv) making central banks accountable.
6 The main features of the reform of monetary 
legislation in Latin America are discussed below, including the applicable constitutional 
provisions—except for Ecuador and El Salvador, where the central banks play no role in 
monetary policy following the adoption of the U.S. dollar as legal tender. 
 
Central banks’ objective 
 
Today, all central bank laws in the region establish that the purpose of the central bank is to 
ensure currency stability or price stability. In some cases, however, central banks are given 
other objectives as well, not always with priorities being set among them (see Table 1). The 
multiplicity of objectives creates potential conflicts of policy. This is the situation in Brazil, 
where, de jure, the central bank is also responsible for fostering or creating conditions 
conducive to growth and economic development.
7 While the latter is a broad objective, the 
                                                 
5 The theoretical underpinnings of this reform—implemented in industrial and developing 
countries alike—are derived from the work of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and 
Gordon (1983), who showed that, when faced with a choice between higher inflation and 
lower unemployment, governments generally favored higher inflation. The institutional 
reform was, in a great extent, inspired in Rogoff’s notion (Rogoff, 1985) of turning over 
monetary policy to a “conservative central banker,” with the aim of reducing the so-called 
“inflation bias.” 
6 The main characteristics of central bank legislation in Latin America are summarized in 
Jácome (2003).  
7 De facto, this potential policy conflict has not been relevant, in particular since the issue of 
the inflation targeting decree in 1999. - 7 - 
 
legal mandate of the central bank may give rise to differing interpretations when it comes to 
formulate monetary policy. In addition, the double mandate of maintaining price and 
financial system stability, with no indication of priority, may place the central bank in a 
situation where it faces potential conflicting objectives, in particular, during periods of 
banking system stress.
8 Beyond these potential policy conflicts, having multiple objectives 
makes more difficult to assess the accountability of central banks. 
 
Table 1. Mandate of the Central Bank 
 
Price stability plus other objectives, with no indication of priority 
Price stability as the sole 
or primary objective  Operation of the payment 
system 
Stability of the financial 
system 
Growth or economic 
development 
Argentina, Bolivia, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, 












Following the institutional reform, Latin American central banks are more independent from 
governments. As observed in Table 2, today central banks’ boards of directors are appointed 
for a tenure that exceeds or overlaps with the country’s constitutional term, rarely including 
private sector representatives or from other public sector entities. In addition, the law 
requires in many countries that the Congress confirm these appointments or, in some cases, 
to appoint them following executive branch nominations.
9 As a key feature of political 
independence, in many countries the new legislation specifies legal grounds for removing 
members of the central bank board of directors and places the final decision in the hands of 
the legislative or the judicial branch.
10 In severing the link between the central bank and the 
                                                 
8 Although in countries like Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay the central bank 
performs the dual role of formulating and conducting monetary policy and supervising and 
regulating banks, the conventional wisdom claims that the objective of maintaining the 
stability of the financial system should be subordinated to the objective of maintaining price 
stability as it is established by law in Argentina. 
9 In several countries, the law establishes different provisions with respect to the central 
bank's governor and its executive board. In those cases, the governor is typically appointed or 
removed by the executive branch, while members of the executive board are appointed or 
removed by the legislative branch. 
10 Yet, in a number of cases, the legislation establishes grounds for removal of central bank 
governors and members of the board, which relate to policy decisions. Guatemala is a case in 
(continued…) - 8 - 
 
executive branch, the reform expanded central banks' decision-making horizon such that 
monetary policy is not subordinated anymore to the countries' political business cycle. 
 
Table 2. Political Independence: Appointment and Removal of 
Members of the Central Bank's Board of Directors 
 
Board of Directors Tenure vis à vis the President of the Republic's Term of Office 1/ 
Longer  Same length, but non-concurrent  Same length, shorter or not specified 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Venezuela 
Bolivia, Colombia, Guatemala  Brazil, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay 
Structure of the Board 
No representation from the 
executive branch or the private 
sector. 
The executive branch is 
represented directly through 
ministers of State. 
In addition to the executive branch, 
the private sector is also 
represented. 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay. 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Nicaragua, Venezuela. 
Guatemala 
Who Appoints or Confirms Members of the Board of Directors 
Legislative branch appoints 
and/or confirms 
Executive branch alone  Between the executive 
branch and the legislative 
branch 
With the involvement of 
the private sector 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 




Peru, Venezuela  Guatemala, Nicaragua 
Mechanism for Removal 
Strictly on legal grounds  On non-legal grounds or for economic policy reasons 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Honduras, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela 
Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Paraguay, Uruguay 
Who Proposes or Decides Upon Removal 
Legislative branch  Executive branch alone  Judicial branch or the executive 
board itself 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
Bolivia, Brazil, Costa Rica, 
Guatemala, Nicaragua 
Dominican Republic, Honduras 
 
    Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2003. 
 
    1/ In some cases, such as Costa Rica, the governor of the central bank is appointed for the same term as the 
     president, but the other members of the executive board are appointed for a longer term.  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
point, as the Congress has the right to dismiss—with a qualified majority—the governor of 
the central bank if it considers that his annual appearance before the Legislature is not 




The provision of instruments independence for the conduct of monetary policy is probably 
the most common feature of the central bank reform in Latin America. This implies that 
central banks have today freedom to formulate and execute monetary policy.
11 To strengthen 
this operational autonomy, central banks are severely restricted, and in some cases 
prohibited, of financing public expenditure (see Table 3).
12 The prohibition of monetizing the 
fiscal deficit reflects the consensus achieved in the region that financing the fiscal deficit has 
historically been the main cause of the chronic inflation that afflicted the region. 
 
Operational independence also implies that central banks are empowered to manage their 
own interest rates, thereby influencing commercial banks’ interest rates, and those of other 
financial instruments.
13 Nonetheless, operational independence is some times undermined as 
a result of central banks’ quasi-fiscal losses—those arising from the discharge of their 
functions. Given that in most countries in Latin America governments are not required to 
make up for central bank losses, or there is no statutory requirement for recapitalization if 
reported capital drops below zero (see Table 3), persistent large losses may reduce the 
operating independence of central banks and eventually may curtail the effectiveness of 
monetary policy actions. The accumulation of central bank losses may limit either their 
capacity to mop up excess liquidity or their ability to raise interest rates when conducting 
open-market-operations, as they become an undesirable source of monetization that will 
require subsequent efforts of sterilization. In the event that operating losses become a 
perennial distortion, like in a number of central banks in the region, markets may cast doubts 
about central banks’ long-term ability to preserve price stability. 
 
 
                                                 
11 In some countries (Mexico and Venezuela, for instance), the government has retained the 
power to co-participate in the formulation of exchange rate policy, which has the potential 
for interfering operational independence. However, this potential restriction is non-binding in 
countries with flexible exchange rate regimes. 
12 Nonetheless, the spirit of this restriction has been violated based on alternative legal 
grounds. A case in point is Venezuela, where the central bank law requires the central bank 
to transfer to the government unrealized profits associated to the revaluation of international 
reserves. Another violation occurs in countries where the annual budget approved by law in 
Congress requires central banks to make transferences to the government, like in Honduras 
and Paraguay, for example. 
13 Exactly how interest rates respond to actions taken by the central bank depends essentially 
on what impact the latter have on inflationary expectations. Changes in interest rates and 
expectations, in turn, affect aggregate supply and demand, and hence, economic activity and 
inflation. - 10 - 
 
Table 3. Operational Economic Independence 
 
Credit to the Government by the Central Bank 
No direct or indirect credit, or 
credit extended on the secondary 
market with limits 
Credit to cope with seasonal 
liquidity shortages, or credit 
extended on the secondary market 
without limits 
Direct credit 
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, 
Brazil, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, 
Venezuela 
Bolivia, Honduras, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Paraguay 
Colombia 
Independence in the Use of Monetary Policy Instruments 
Full independence in monetary and 
exchange rate policy 
Restrictions on the conduct of 
monetary or exchange rate policy 
Monetary and exchange rate policy 
set by the government 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Uruguay 




Government is required to maintain 
central bank's capital 
Government is authorized but is 
not required to capitalize the 
central bank, or capitalizes it with 
nonnegotiable bonds 
No legal basis exists for the 
government capitalizing the central 
bank 
Brazil, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, 
Peru, Venezuela 
Bolivia, Chile, Mexico  Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Uruguay 
 
   Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2003, and Fiscal  
   Responsibility Law in Brazil. 
 
 
There are other situations where central banks' autonomy to conduct monetary policy is 
restricted. An undesirable situation is that of Guatemala, where the national Congress 
approves the issue of central bank paper for open-market-operations purposes, a situation that 
may inhibit the conduct of monetary policy. In addition, there are central banks that do not 
have financial independence as Congress approves their budget, and therefore, they may lack 




Accountability requirements are an innovating feature of the legislation governing most 
central banks in Latin America (see Table 4). The purpose of this reform was to hold central  - 11 - 
 
Table 4. Central Bank Accountability 
 
Reporting by the Central Bank 
Formal appearance before the legislature  Submission of a report to the executive or legislative 
branch, or publication of a report in the news media 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican 
Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Venezuela 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, Peru, 
Uruguay, Mexico 
Publication and Transparency of Information  
Financial statements certified by 
external auditors 
Financial statements certified by a 
public agency separated from the 
central bank 
Financial statements signed by an 
auditor appointed by the central 
bank's executive board 
Argentina, Chile, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Nicaragua 
Brazil, Colombia, Honduras, 
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, Peru 
 
   Source: Latin American national constitutions and central bank legislation as of 2003, and Fiscal  
   Responsibility Law in Brazil.  
 
 
banks accountable in exchange for the substantial independence they were granted. Until the 
reform, central banks in the region typically published an annual report describing the overall 
economic performance of the countries, which served essentially as an historical record and 
not as an accountability procedure. Following the reforms of the 1990s, central bank 
governors in a number of countries are required to appear before the legislature to report on 
the conduct of monetary policies and the performance in pursuing their objective of 
preserving price stability. In addition, central banks publish regularly its monetary program 
for the foreseeable future, in a number of cases, together with an inflation report that assesses 
central banks’ actions aimed at achieving the inflation targets. 
 
A critical component of central banks' accountability is the transparency of financial 
transactions. In this regard, Table 4 shows that there is room for improvement in a number of 
central banks in the region. While practically all central banks disclose their financial 
statements on a regular basis, best practices advice that central banks disclose them certified 
by an external audit firm, which verify that central banks' transactions have been properly 
recorded in accordance with international accounting standards. In fact, a number of central 
banks in the region do not account properly operational losses and eventually they hide 
negative capital positions. 
 
B.   How Independent Are Central Banks in Latin America? 
Latin American central banks enjoy greater independence today than they did before the 
reforms. To reach this conclusion, we use an expanded and slightly modified version of the 
Cukierman index (Cukierman, 1992) as a quantitative criterion to gauge the institutional - 12 - 
 
impact of the reforms.
14 We calculate an index of legal central bank independence (CBI) for 
the old and new legislation governing central banks to ascertain how legal independence has 
evolved over time. The CBI index also allows us to compare the legal independence of 
central banks across countries. 
 
The index of CBI was estimated based on the provisions contained in the central bank 
legislation and the relevant parts of national constitutions and applied to the 15 countries in 
the region referred to in section II.A.
15 Thus, it does not measure the central banks' effective 
independence. The difference between de jure and de facto independence is relevant, in 
particular in countries where institutions are weak, where a good central bank law may not be 
observed in practice. The high rate of turnover of central bank governors in most countries in 
the region (see section V.A) can illustrate the lack of effective central bank independence in 
Latin America, since in many cases it reflects an early dismissal of central bank governors 
when their actions were at odds with government policies. In contrast, there are countries in 
which the central bank legislation is rather poor but the government values the institutional 
role and decisions of the central bank, as witnessed for example in Brazil during the last ten 
years. 
 
The index of CBI is built on five different aspects of central bank independence, which are 
assigned different weights in the spirit of Cukierman (1992). The resulting value of the CBI 
gives a score between zero and one. The first aspect measures political independence of the 
central bank by assessing the modality of appointment of central banks’ board of directors, 
the length of their tenure—relative to the term of the executive branch—and the legal 
provisions for their removal (20 percent). The second relates to the nature of the central 
bank's mandate, assigning high marks to those central banks that pursue primarily the 
objective of preserving price stability (15 percent). The third aspect relates to the autonomy 
of central banks in the formulation of monetary policy (15 percent). The fourth criterion 
assesses central bank's restrictions in lending provisions to the government and to 
commercial banks as a lender of last resort, as well as its financial independence 40 percent). 
The fifth one evaluates central banks' accountability requirements (10 percent).
16  
 
Latin American central banks are considerably more independent today than they were in 
1990, although the degree of independence varies from one country to another. The average 
modified Cukierman index increased from 0.427 to 0.774 in the wake of the institutional 
                                                 
14 The differences between the Cukierman index and the modified index used in this paper are 
described in Jácome and Vázquez (2005). 
15 In the case of Brazil, the legal framework also included the relevant provisions in the 
Fiscal Responsibility Law approved in 2000, which strengthen financial independence and 
accountability of the Central Bank of Brazil. 
16 Jácome and Vázquez (2005) discuss the specifics of this index. - 13 - 
 
reform. On the other hand, current independence is not uniform across countries in the 
region. Table 5 identifies two groups of countries. Group 1 encompasses those countries 
where central banks became more independent, which have a CBI index of over 0.80 (Peru, 
Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic). The remaining countries, 
Group 2, have less independent central banks as the CBI index is in the range of 0.65 to 0.79. 
There is also a third group, which includes all countries prior to the reform of their central 
bank legislation, whose CBI is below 0.60 and mostly smaller than 0.50, except for Brazil.  
 
Table 5. Legal Independence of Latin American Central Banks 
(Modified Cukierman index, end-2003) 
 
Group 1  CBI  Group 2  CBI  Group 3  CBI 
Peru–1 0.862  Argentina–1  0.788 Brazil  */  0.641
Chile–1 0.846  Venezuela-1  0.750 Nicaragua–0  0.590
Colombia–1 0.827  Costa  Rica–1  0.739 Guatemala–0  0.565
Bolivia–1 0.825  Nicaragua–1  0.733 Costa  Rica–0  0.510
Mexico–1 0.805  Paraguay–1  0.702 Peru–0  0.502
Dominican Republic–1  0.805  Guatemala–1  0.690 Dominican Republic–0  0.435
   Honduras–1  0.682 Uruguay–0  0.435
   Uruguay–1  0.669 Venezuela–0  0.395
      Mexico–0  0.388
      Honduras–0  0.385
      Paraguay–0  0.368
      Bolivia–0  0.326
      Argentina–0  0.314
      Colombia–0  0.289
      Chile–0  0.263
Average – Group 1  0.828  Average – Group 2  0.719 Average – Group 3  0.427
 
*/ Incorporates provisions from the Fiscal Responsibility Law (2000) and a Constitutional 
amendment (2003) that strengthens the central bank’s independence. 
Note: Country–1 refers to the measurement subsequent to the reforms, while Country–0 refers to the 
measurement prior to the reforms. 
 
 
Breaking down the CBI index into political independence, economic independence, and 
accountability, we conclude that the increase in independence was not uniform with respect 
to all three criteria. While the differences vis-à-vis Group 3 are evident in all three criteria, 
the difference between Groups 1 and 2 is found primarily in terms of political 
independence—appointment and removal of central banks’ board of directors and central 
banks' mandate—and to less extent in terms of accountability. In turn, operational 
independence, including the autonomy to formulate monetary policy, is virtually uniform in 
all countries that reformed their central bank legislation. 
 - 14 - 
 
III.   LEGAL CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND MACROECONOMIC TRENDS IN         
LATIN AMERICA 
Latin America has improved its macroeconomic performance from 1990 onward, although 
the results are below the initial expectations. Without question, the greatest achievement has 
been to bring inflation down to single-digit levels. This section reviews briefly major 
macroeconomic developments and stresses the contribution of CBI to disinflation. To 
characterize CBI, we use the modified Cukierman index and apply it to the period preceding 
the reform in each country and to the subsequent years up to 2003.  
 
A.   A Brief Tour on the Macroeconomic Performance Following the Reform 
Although the macroeconomic results achieved in Latin America do not fully meet the 
expectations raised at the time the reforms were instituted, there was indeed an improvement 
in comparison with the previous decade.
17 The progress is particularly striking concerning 
inflation as it plunged to single-digit rates despite the deleterious effects of successive real 
and financial shocks that hit the region since mid-1990s onward.  
 
Table 6 reviews the macroeconomic performance of Latin America during the period 1980 to 
2003 divided into three subperiods. First, the 1980s, before the reform of central banks 
materialized. Second, the first half of the 1990s, when most economies in the region 
reformed their central bank legislation and other structural reforms were enacted. And third, 
from 1996 onwards, when most countries in the region had completed the reform of their 
central bank legislation. For each subperiod, macroeconomic indicators are weighted 
according to the country’s relative GDP. 
 
Latin America reversed the economic downturn of the 1980s but only achieved a per-capita 
GDP growth of less than 1 percent. The slight deceleration in economic growth that took 
place during the recent period largely reflects the impact of financial crises that hit a number 
of countries from mid-1990s onward. México and Venezuela in the mid-1990s and 
Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay towards 
the late 1990s and early 2000s are cases in point. 
 
The external and fiscal performance of the region featured mixed results. The pace of growth 
in the volume of exports accelerated and the current account deficit remained on check—at 
less than 3 percent of GDP. However, the fiscal deficit has picked up recently following the 
drastic reduction achieved in the first half of the 1990s, and the public external debt remains 
high despite its reduction following debt restructurings negotiated during the late-1980s and 
early 1990s.
18 The deterioration of public finances also reflects the adverse effects of banking 
                                                 
17 This analysis looks at all the countries in the region, including the Caribbean countries. 
18 The fiscal deficit in this case corresponds only to the central government data alone rather 
than using information from the non-financial public sector. - 15 - 
 
and currency crises, which in a few cases also turned into a simultaneous sovereign debt 
crises—like those in Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay. 
 
 
Table 6. Latin American Economic Performance 
(1980–2003.  In percentages) 
 
  1980–1989 1990–1995 1996–2003 
Per capita real GDP growth  -0.14  0.89  0.85 
Inflation rate (period average)  149.19  227.85  9.93 
Exports (volume growth rate)  8.01  8.24  8.99 
Current account /  GDP  -2.21  -2.20  -2.44 
Fiscal balance / GDP  -3.79  -0.68  -2.63 
External Public Debt / GDP  46.86  38.44  40.09 
 
      Source: Western Hemisphere Department, International Monetary Fund. 
 
      1/ Includes the Caribbean countries. 
 
 
B.   Has CBI Played Any Role in Reducing Inflation in Latin America? 
As opposed to other regions, the contribution of CBI towards reducing inflation in Latin 
America has received little attention in the literature. A recent paper by Jácome and Vázquez 
(2005) finds that CBI is statistically significant in explaining inflation performance between 
1990 and 2002 for the Latin American and Caribbean economies. The analysis incorporates 
the periods before and after central bank reforms, and controls for other macroeconomic 
variables and for a broad index of structural reform that excludes the monetary reform.
19 This 
section highlights the salient aspects of the correlation between the CBI index and inflation 
for Latin American countries albeit without establishing causality from CBI to inflation. 
 
As a first approximation, Figures 1 to 2 show the relationship between the CBI index and 
both inflation and the fiscal deficit, before and after the monetary reform. The pre-reform 
period covers the five years prior to the reform of the central bank in each country, including 
                                                 
19 Studies using samples that include developed countries and economies in transition reach a 
similar conclusion. For studies that look at developed countries, see for example the seminal 
works by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) and Cukierman (1992), as well as the 
study by Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and the more recent studies by Eijffinger, Schaling, 
and Hoeberichts (1998), and Brumm (2000). For studies that look at economies in transition, 
see for example Loungani and Sheets (1997) and Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002). - 16 - 
 
the year in which legal changes materialized, while the post-reform period goes up to 2003. 
For each period, averages for inflation and for the nonfinancial public sector deficit were 




Figure 1.  CBI and Inflation in Latin America











































Figure 2. CBI and Fiscal Deficit in Latin America




























                                                 
20 Exceptionally, the post-reform period considered for Ecuador goes up only to 1999 and for 
El Salvador only to 2000, when those two countries adopted the U.S. dollar as legal tender. - 17 - 
 
The negative correlation between inflation and the CBI index in Latin America is statistically 
confirmed. The analysis is conducted lagging the CBI index with respect to the year of 
approval of the institutional reform of monetary policy in each country. The purpose of 
lagging this variable is to capture a learning process associated to the implementation of the 
new monetary policy framework and the development of the expertise required to operate 
under the new institutional framework. In addition, the lags make room for a process of 
building credibility, which is a necessary asset that central banks require to reduce inflation. 
The regression also includes two dummy variables to control for other potential influences in 
price formation and to limit the adverse statistical effect of a missing variables problem. The 
first dummy variable seeks to isolate the effect on inflation of systemic banking crises.
21 In 
turn, the second dummy variable is intended to capture the influence on disinflation from 
fixed and hard-peg exchange rate regimes—measured on the basis of a de facto criterion, 
according to the IMF's classification of countries' exchange rate regimes. In addition, the 
analysis controls for world inflation (measured in terms of the average inflation in the G-7 
countries) to take into account the potential influence of external inflation in the disinflation 
process in Latin America. Likewise, an index of structural reform is included as an 
independent variable, which may have contributed to reduce rigidities in price formation.
22 
Table 7 reports the results of the regression using panel data for the 17 Latin American 
countries considered in the preceding section for the period from 1990 to 2002, and hence, 
including the pre-reform and post-reform periods.
23 The coefficients of all variables have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant at least at 5 percent. In particular, the level of 
significance of the coefficient of the variable CBI improves as the time lag increases to three 
and four periods, which is consistent with the idea that central banks gain ability to defeat 
inflation as they build credibility and achieve expertise in the conduct of monetary policy. 
 
IV.   CHANGES IN THE POLICY REGIME AND INNOVATIONS IN THE OPERATING 
FRAMEWORK OF MONETARY POLICY 
The reform of central bank legislation in Latin America contributed to the change in the 
monetary policy regime and the operating framework observed in most countries of the 
region. Following the reform, most central banks increasingly migrated from exchange rate  
                                                 
21 For this dummy variable, a value of 1 is assigned in the years when a systemic banking 
crisis occurred and 0 elsewhere. 
22 This variable takes a value in the range of 0 to 1, with higher variables reflecting deeper 
structural reforms. The data is obtained from the structural reform index calculated for Latin 
America by the Inter-American Development Bank. The index incorporates reforms in the 
trade, tax, financial, and labor spheres, and also includes privatization (see Lora, 2001). 
23 The specifics of the methodology used in this statistical exercise are similar to those 
discussed in Jácome and Vázquez (2005) for a sample that also includes the Caribbean 
countries. - 18 - 
 
Table 7. Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin America 
(Panel regressions of inflation on lagged CBI data) 
 
Dependent variable: inflation scaled as π/(1+π) 
















































Number of observations  158  147  133  117 
Number of countries  17  17  17  17 
Rho 0.56  0.50  0.40  0.33 
 
   Standard errors in parentheses. 
   * Significant at 10 percent, ** Significant at 5 percent, *** Significant at 1 percent. 
   The coefficients were estimated using Feasible Generalized Least Squares, allowing for heteroscedasticity across countries  
   and an AR(1) autocorrelation structure within countries, with a (Rho) coefficient common to all countries. Dummy  
   Banking Crises equals 1 during years with banking crises and 0 elsewhere. Dummy Exchange Rate Regime equals 1  
   during periods of fixed exchange regimes and 0 elsewhere. World inflation is measured by the average inflation of  
   industrial countries (IFS series 110), and the index of structural reforms varies in the interval [0, 1] with higher values  
   indicating deeper economic reforms. 
 
 
pegs towards exchange rate flexibility. However, instead of adopting a monetary anchor, a 
number of central banks adopted an inflation targeting (IT) strategy as a way of anchoring 
inflation expectations. At the same time, these central banks modernized their operating 
framework for monetary policy, shifting from the traditional modality of controlling money 
base as an intermediate target to an alternative regime where the central bank typically uses a 
short-run interest rate as an operational variable. 
 
A.   Changes in the Monetary Policy Regime 
Throughout the 1990s, most Latin American countries made changes to their monetary 
policy regime. At the beginning of the decade, with the region having in average a triple-digit 
inflation rate, most countries embarked on stabilization strategies based on a nominal 
exchange rate anchor, usually based on regimes involving exchange rate bands and supported 
by growing capital inflows into the region. According to the classification in Table 8, in 1990 
seven of the 18 countries in the region had a flexible exchange rate, while by 1995 there were 
only five. All other countries had a fixed or "super-fixed” peg, or some intermediate 
arrangement (typically crawling pegs or horizontal and crawling bands), which in terms of 
expectations worked as if they were fixed pegs. Thus, in an environment of high capital 
mobility and fixed exchange rates, the majority of Latin American central banks had, at least 
in part, given up their ability to conduct monetary policy.  - 19 - 
 
 
Table 8. Exchange Rate Regimes in Latin America 
(De facto classification) 
 
  Fixed exchange rate 
or "hard peg"*  Intermediate regimes**  Floating exchange rates*** 
1990  Dominican Republic, Honduras, 
Panama 
Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Uruguay 
 
Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Paraguay, Peru, 
Venezuela  
1995  Argentina, El Salvador,  
Panama, Venezuela 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Uruguay 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru 
2003  El Salvador, Ecuador, Panama, 
Venezuela 
Bolivia, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Nicaragua 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, 
Peru, Uruguay 
   Source: Bubula and Ötker-Robe (2002) and "Annual Report of Exchange Arrangements and  Exchange Restrictions,"    
   International Monetary Fund (2003). 
 
   *     Includes regimes involving formal dollarization, a monetary union, a currency board, or fixed 
             exchange rates pegged to one currency or a basket of currencies. 
   **     Includes regimes involving horizontal bands (forward looking and backward looking) crawling  
              pegs, and forward looking and backward looking crawling bands. 




With the reinforced autonomy of central banks to formulate and execute monetary policy, 
flexibility gained popularity and today 10 countries have adopted a flexible exchange rate 
regime. In addition, the number of countries that formally dollarized has risen to three, which 
confirms the bipolar trend in the choice of exchange rate regimes (Fischer, 2001). A small 
group of countries, kept the exchange rate as the nominal anchor. This is mostly observed in 
the Central American countries, given their increasing integration with the U.S. economy, 
and due to the high degree of financial dollarization. In this environment, central banks 
preferred to avoid devaluations to limit their negative impact on market expectations, price 
formation, and the financial system's balance sheets. 
 
While abandoning the intermediate exchange rates, many central banks did not return to 
monetary targeting regimes. First, central banks discarded exchange rate pegs due to their 
intrinsic vulnerability to exogenous shocks in a world of high capital mobility. Exchange rate 
pegs proved also exposed to unsustainable fiscal disequilibrium, aggravated by the fact that 
exiting the peg was prone to speculative attacks and eventually to currency and possible 
banking crises. Monetary targeting was not considered an alternative either as central banks 
found difficult to predict the course of monetary aggregates in the short-run, given the 
instability of the demand for money and the volatility of the money multiplier. As a result, 
central banks would find it difficult to commit to a credible economic management based on 
the control of a monetary variable as an intermediate policy target. 
 
 - 20 - 
 
Unfortunately, the transition to exchange rate flexibility was traumatic. It took place amid 
financial crises that made intermediate exchange rate regimes unsustainable (Brazil, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Uruguay, and Venezuela, to mention a few examples) and sparked swift and steep 
devaluations. Only Chile and Colombia managed to make an orderly transition, even though 
Colombia did it in the middle of a banking crisis.  
 
With the change to a flexible exchange rate regime, a number of central banks gradually 
instituted IT schemes in the second half of the 1990s (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and 
Peru). The adoption of IT schemes did not simply mean announcing multiyear inflation 
targets, but implied instead the adoption of an alternative monetary policy framework. On the 
basis of their enhanced independence and a clearly defined policy objective, these central 
banks implemented transparent decision-making mechanisms and stringent accountability 
practices. In addition, insofar as possible, central banks adopted a monetary policy rule that 
was widely disclosed and explained to the market, with the aim of guiding economic agents 
about their policy reaction function when facing potential inflationary pressures. As a key 
component of the new monetary regime, IT central banks developed inflation forecasting 
models to predict more accurately future inflation, and hence, to better support inflation 
target announcements. 
 
B.   The New Operational Framework 
The adoption of IT regimes contributed to the modernization of the operational framework 
for monetary policy in Latin America. As a result, central banks established a coherent 
framework based on the control of systemic banks liquidity, the use of a short-term interest 
rate as the principal instrument of monetary policy, and the adoption of transparent policy 
rules to send signals to the market about their monetary policy stance. In adopting these 
rules, central banks sought to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy by facilitating the 
alignment of market expectations with inflation targets.  
 
Most central banks adopted the overnight interest rate—rather than a quantity variable—as 
their operational or policy variable based on the criterion that overnight rates are easier to 
control (Table 9).
24 To steer interbank interest rates close to the operational variable, central 
banks engage in open-market-operations using overnight repo—and reverse repo—
operations. In any case, because the interbank rate may be subject to volatility, most central 
banks that have adopted IT schemes established an interest rate corridor to mitigate such 
volatility. The floor of the corridor is typically the overnight rate applicable to a deposit 
facility, instituted to serve financial intermediaries that did not want, or were unable, to place 
their excess liquidity on the interbank market at the end of the day. The ceiling of the 
corridor is usually the rate charged by the central bank to financial intermediaries requesting 
overnight liquidity assistance. 
                                                 
24 In industrialized countries there is a general trend to use the short-term interest rate as the 
operational variable.  - 21 - 
 
 
Table 9. Main Characteristics of Monetary Policy Operating Framework 
(Selected Latin American countries) 
 
 





(Price or Quantity) 
Argentina Monetary  base  Daily  No  None 
Brazil  Overnight interest rate  Daily  Yes  Interest rate 
Chile  Overnight interest rate  Daily  Yes  Interest rate 
Colombia  Overnight interest rate  Daily  Yes  Interest rate 
Dominican Republic  Net domestic assets*  Weekly  Yes  None 
Guatemala  Net domestic assets*  Weekly  No  None 
Mexico Bank  liquidity  Daily  No  Liquidity 
Paraguay  Net domestic assets*  No  No  None 
Peru  Overnight interest rate  Daily  Yes  Interest rate 
Uruguay Monetary  base  (monthly 
average) 
Daily No Monetary  base 
 
*  This is a de facto variable in the framework of the economic program these countries have negotiated with 
the IMF. Strictly speaking, it is more of an intermediate variable, in terms of traditional financial 
programming, rather than an operational variable. 
 
 
In addition, central banks, in particular in IT countries, generally use the policy rate to signal 
changes in the stance of monetary policy. For instance, they increase the policy rate (the 
SELIC rate in Brazil, for example) when inflationary pressures strengthen and decrease it 
when they ease. As an exception, Mexico uses a quantity variable (the corto) with the same 
purpose. Typically, central bank monetary policy committees adopt these decisions during 
preannounced meetings. 
 
With the adoption of an operational target, central banks seek to influence the behavior of 
longer-term interest rates, including those charged by financial intermediaries. In turn, central 
banks expect that financial systems’ interest rates tend to influence aggregate demand and 
aggregate supply, and hence, inflation.
25 In this connection, the operational target has become 
a key factor in the monetary policy transmission mechanism.  
 
V.   CHALLENGES FACING LATIN AMERICA'S CENTRAL BANKS 
Despite the successes in defeating inflation, central banks in Latin America still face 
important challenges in the perspective of consolidating credibility and conquering inflation. 
First, Latin America’s inflation has still to converge toward the world inflation—as measured 
through the G-7 countries’ inflation rate. Second, most central banks in the region need to 
                                                 
25 The impact on the real sector of the economy is a direct function of the development of the 
financial market, especially the interbank market. - 22 - 
 
restore confidence in the domestic currency, not only as a mean of transaction, but also as a 
store of value. An third, central banks needs to cope with capital inflows without sacrificing 
the objective of attaining and preserving price stability. Overcoming these difficulties, 
however, is not only a central bank duty since governments also bear some responsibilities, 
in particular, preserving the stability of the financial system and maintaining fiscal deficits on 
check. 
 
While this document provides general recommendations to cope with today’s main central 
bank challenges, more specific proposals are needed. They should be widely analyzed in the 
years to come as part of the research agenda of central banks in the region and, to some 
extent, of the multilateral financial institutions. 
  
A.   Achieve Price Stability 
While inflation in Latin America has already declined in average to single digits, in most 
countries it has not converged yet to the world inflation. When measuring inflation for the 
period 2002-2004, only one third of the countries in the region reached a rate below 4 
percent, with two of those six countries having been formally dollarized.  Likewise, almost 
one half of all countries—excluding the dollarized economies—featured a rate that exceeded 
8 percent in average in the same period (see Figure 3), which is approximately the threshold 
identified in the empirical literature as carrying costs in terms of economic growth.
26 In 2004, 
while in a number of countries inflation dropped markedly (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, 
Uruguay), in other countries, particularly in Central America, inflation picked up to about 10 
percent on average at the end of the year. 
 
Further reducing inflation should be a key goal of central banks in Latin America. However, 
this may be an increasingly difficult endeavor because of its potential adverse effects in 
output.
27 While in the 1990s governments in the region seemed to unconditionally support 
anti-inflation policies as a vital social objective, today this emphasis has lost momentum and, 
instead, governments are focusing their efforts in spurring economic growth—after three 
years of negative growth in per-capita GDP and three decades of very modest improvement. 
                                                 
26 See Sarel (1996), which places the threshold at 8 percent, and the more recent work by 
Khan and Senhadji (2000) which, for developing countries only, places the threshold in the 
range of 7 to 11 percent. 
27 In the last ten years there has been increased attention in the industrial countries to the 
analysis of the negative effects on output stemming from disinflation efforts, in particular 
following the institutional reform that strengthened central banks independence. In this 
connection, Fischer (1995), Fischer (1996), and Gartner (1997) found empirical evidence of a 
positive correlation between central bank independence and the “sacrifice ratio.” 
Furthermore, Andersen and Wascher (1999) claim that the “trade-off” between inflation and 
growth—in industrial countries—intensifies when inflation is below 8 per cent. - 23 - 
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The alternative is that central banks keep on seeking the objective of price stability but 
simultaneously minimizing the potential adverse effects on output. To this end, the key 
ingredient is to continue along the path of strengthening central banks’ reputation and 
credibility.
28 The more solid is central banks’ reputation and credibility, the lower are real 
interest rates required to maintain simultaneously price stability and a stable path of output 
growth. Achieving this goal depends on the combination of policy and institutional factors.  
 
Implementing a more efficient monetary policy hinges not only on central banks’ ability to 
conduct monetary policy, but also on making central banks’ policy more transparent and 
predictable.
29 In this connection, while central banks in the region, especially IT central 
banks, have already enhanced accountability and transparency standards following their 
institutional reform, there is still room for improvement. Based on the international standards 
for measuring the transparency of monetary policy, Latin America ranks behind Europe, 
                                                 
28 The difference between these two policy features is subtle and difficult to separate. One 
form of separating these two concepts is to associate reputation with the stock of monetary 
policy successes—the accumulated past achievements in terms of inflation—and to link 
credibility with the public’s assessment of current monetary policy (Siklos, 2002). 
29 The link between more transparency and less inflation has not received much attention in 
the literature, but it is subject of increasing interest by academics and practitioners. 
Chortareas and others (2002) provide empirical support in industrial countries. - 24 - 
 
Asia, and Middle East and Central Asia in terms of its transparency of monetary policy.
30 As 
illustrated in Figure 4, the percentage of criteria of the code of transparency of monetary 
policy that are “fully observed” or “broadly observed” is 76 percent in Latin America against 





Figure 4. Transparency of Monetary Policy 








































































                                 Source: Standards and Codes Gateway (Monetary and Financial 
                                              Systems Department, IMF). 
 
 
In addition to what central banks can do to fulfill their mandate of arresting inflation, their 
autonomy should receive the support of governments and societies. At present, the record of 
instability of central bank governors in their posts raise concerns about whether central banks 
are autonomous in practice. Using the turnover rate of central bank governors as a proxy for 
effective central bank independence,
32 we found that the average rate in Latin America is 
                                                 
30 See the IMF’s Transparency Code for Good Practices in Monetary and Financial Policies: 
Declaration of Principles (1999). The assessment of transparency practices is conducted on a 
qualitative basis using five categories: observed, broadly observed, partially observed, non-
observed, and not applicable. 
31 The sample in Latin America includes most countries except for some key players like 
Argentina, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
32 A similar indicator has been used previously in the literature (see Cukierman, 1992 and 
more recently, De Haan and Kooi, 2000), although it has also been criticized under the 
argument that it may also imply a lack of political autonomy, as docile central bank 
governors will have better chances of remaining in their posts. - 25 - 
 
approximately 0.4.
33 Thus, in average, a central bank governor remains in office for about 
two and a half years. This period, however, is clearly less than the term of appointment of 
central bank governors in the region—typically between four and six years. In addition, it is 
well below the effective term of central bank governors in industrial countries.
34 By country, 
Bolivia, Colombia, and Mexico seem to have the most stable central bank authorities, 
whereas Brazil and Ecuador feature the least stable (Figure 5).
35 The high rate of turnover of 
central bank governors in a number of Latin American countries suggests that monetary 
authorities remain vulnerable to political pressures and to periods of political instability. 
 
 






















                                                 
33 The turnover rate of central bank governors was obtained by dividing the number of central 
bank governors by the number of years following the enactment of the new law that 
instituted central banks’ autonomy in each country—until 2003. Thus, the lower is this rate, 
the more stable have been central banks authorities, and presumably, more independent they 
have been from a political perspective. 
34 For the sake of comparison, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal 
Reserve remains in post since 1987, whereas in the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England 
the latest governors remained in their posts during the whole term to which they were 
appointed—7 and 10 years, respectively. 
35 For Ecuador, the rate corresponds to the period 1992-1999 and for El Salvador 1991-2000, 
when the central bank reform was adopted and before dollarization was formally instituted in 
each country. For Brazil, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala, the whole period 1990-
2003 was applied. - 26 - 
 
B.   Restore Confidence in Domestic Currencies 
A second key challenge facing most central banks in Latin America is to restore markets’ 
confidence in the national currencies. This is in general a legacy of periods of high inflation 
experienced by a number of countries in the region. The central banks affected by this 
problem can be divided into two groups: (i) those that decided to sacrifice their monetary 
“independence” by tying their currency, to one degree or another, to the U.S. dollar in order 
to reduce inflation; and (ii) those which have not yet recovered their monetary independence 
following past episodes of high inflation and/or financial instability.
36 
 
The case of countries that have tied their currency to the U.S. dollar 
 
This first group consists primarily of some countries in Central America. As small and very 
open economies with close ties to the United States, these countries increasingly adopted the 
U.S. dollar as a means of payment; meanwhile, given that exchange rate fluctuations exert a 
significant influence on price formation in the economy, central banks decided to use the 
exchange rate as a nominal anchor to guide inflation expectations. In this environment, 
dollarization of liabilities became increasingly high, to the point where real depreciations 
could inflict a marked negative impact on the financial obligations of individuals, companies, 
and the government. This potential damaging effect led central banks to the so-called "fear of 
floating" the exchange rate.
37 In any case, prudent fiscal policies in most countries and 
capital inflows from abroad favored the sustainability of exchange rate pegs. 
 
Without question, the use of an exchange rate anchor has helped to bring down inflation. But 
it is also true that this policy regime also bears costs and vulnerabilities. The main drawback 
is the lack of a rapid and low-cost exit strategy from the exchange rate peg, which is critical 
in light of recurrent real and financial shocks that hit most countries in the region. In 
addition, the use of an exchange rate peg precluded central banks from conducting monetary 
policy, and hence developing the skills necessary to formulate and manage monetary policy 
and building institutional credibility was relegated to a secondary place. This turned into a 
costly shortcoming when the countries were forced to exit the peg, for example in the midst 
of a financial crisis.  
 
Looking ahead, the central banks of this group of countries need to assess whether it is wise 
to continue with the current monetary regime or to shift to an alternative scheme. This means 
weighing the benefits of keeping the exchange rate anchor—once inflation has been brought 
down to single-digit levels but still without lowering it to the international inflation level—
against the potential costs embedded in such a regime. If the decision is to stay with the peg, 
                                                 
36 There are also countries such as Chile, Colombia, and Mexico that have achieved a position 
of monetary independence. 
37 See Calvo and Reinhart (2002). - 27 - 
 
the central banks will need to maintain a higher level of international reserves than would be 
necessary under a flexible regime, to assure the markets that the exchange rate will be held 
stable, even in the face of exogenous and policy-induced shocks. In addition, although fiscal 
discipline and the soundness of the financial system are necessary conditions for the proper 
functioning of any monetary regime, they are especially important under fixed or quasi-fixed 
exchange rate regimes because of the devastating macroeconomic consequences of a 
disorderly exit from the peg stemming from loose fiscal and financial polices. This is the 
lesson of several recent episodes, in which exchange rate anchors were abandoned in the 
midst of fiscal and/or financial crises exerting very high macroeconomic costs (Argentina, 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Mexico are valid cases in point). 
 
Should the decision be to migrate to a flexible exchange rate regime, the transition should be 
gradual. This strategy will give the central banks time to learn how to conduct monetary 
policy and improve their understanding of monetary policy transmission. Simultaneously, the 
central banks would have to invest in building reputation and gaining credibility, based on 
their ability to meet monetary targets and reduce inflation, an objective that can only be 
achieved over time. 
 
Under a flexible exchange regime, a relevant question is whether central banks should pursue 
a monetary targeting strategy or if they should adopt an IT regime. This query relates to the 
debate about whether IT regimes demand pre-requirements for its implementation. There is 
no consensus on this issue. Some consider that certain prerequisites are desirable but not 
essential, since the adoption of an IT regime brings about an endogenous learning process 
over time (see Truman, 2003, for example). Our view is that, before announcing a 
commitment to an IT scheme, central banks must put in place some fundamental conditions 
to assure the proper functioning of the new regime and minimize the risk of initial failures, 
which may undermine the success of the IT regime. The following four conditions should be 
included at the very least: (i) having an appropriate legal framework which identifies price 
stability as central bank's primary objective, empowers the central bank with political and 
operational independence to achieve such objective, and establishes rigorous accountability 
and transparency mechanisms; (ii) eliminating for practical purposes any other primary goal, 
whether explicit or implicit, and especially any goals involving the exchange rate; 
(iii) eliminating fiscal dominance, if it exists; and (iv) strengthening the financial system.
38 
On the other hand, having in place basic institutional capacities may also be crucial to run a 
policy regime that relies on more sophisticated expertise. In addition, countries featuring low 
developed financial markets and a stable money demand, may find more effective and easier 
to handle a monetary targeting regime.  
 
If countries irreversibly abandon their currency, thereby giving up their right to make 
monetary policy, the question is whether there is any reason for the existence of a central 
                                                 
38 Carare et al. (2002) contains a detailed discussion of the initial conditions that need to be 
established in order to support an IT regime. - 28 - 
 
bank. So far, none of the recently dollarized economies in Latin America—Ecuador and 
El Salvador—has tackled this question formally, and so their central banks continue to exist, 
performing tasks of secondary importance vis à vis central bank's basic functions of issuing 
money and conducting monetary policy.
39 Operating these institutions, however, bears costs 
that society has to pay. An alternative to maintaining the costly status quo or to closing down 
central banks would be to give them the fundamental responsibility of financial supervision, 
by taking over or merging them with the public institutions in charge of these duties—and 
perhaps having them continue performing other secondary functions as they do now. 
 
The case of countries that have a legacy of past periods of inflation 
 
A number of central banks in the region succeeded in reducing inflation but failed to restore 
full confidence in the domestic currencies. Although inflation has been significantly reduced, 
and in some countries brought down to the world level, the years of macroeconomic 
instability are still alive in the market participants’ mind. As a result, certain distortions 
endure, particularly a high level of financial dollarization and the so-called “peso problem.”  
 
Financial dollarization in Latin America is very high, reaching in some cases about 
90 percent like in Bolivia and Uruguay. After several years—and even decades—of high 
inflation in a number of countries in the region, markets have not recover confidence in the 
domestic currency, in particular in terms of its role as a store of value. As a result, financial 
dollarization rocketed during the 1990s despite the decline in inflation (Figure 6). While 
financial dollarization entails some benefits, it also brings about costs and distortions.
40 In 
terms of monetary policy, as money base in domestic currency shrinks, central banks have 
only a small room for maneuver. Moreover, in light of high liability dollarization, central 
banks feel “fear of floating” and are compelled to maintain sizeable volumes of international 
reserves as a buffer to tackle potential speculative attacks and banking crises featuring large 
deposit withdrawals. As a result, a vicious circle is set in motion since the lack of exchange 
rate flexibility leads market participants to take further foreign currency risks; these enhances 
dollarization and strengthens central banks’ “fear of a floating,” thereby reinforcing exchange 
rate inflexibility.  
  
                                                 
39 In those countries central banks perform the role of fiscal agency, regulate and coordinate 
the payment system, invest international reserves, carry out macroeconomic studies, and 
recover portfolio assets which were pledged as collateral in exchange for the loans granted 
during previous episodes of banking crises 
40 An assessment of the risks and benefits of financial dollarization is out of the scope of this 
document. This analysis is conducted in De Nicolo, Honohan, and Ize (2005). - 29 - 
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The “peso problem” is typically manifested by high real interest rates in domestic currency. 
It represents the markets’ perception of a potential risk, albeit minimum, of a sudden 
depreciation of the domestic currency. Strictly speaking, high real interest rates also capture 
“country risk” and “banking crises risk,” and hence, they emerge in light of periods of fiscal 
fragility and/or financial instability. High real interest rates are observed in a number of 
countries in the region, as observed in Figure 7, but are a particularly distorting feature in 
Brazil. 
   
Figure 7. Real Interest Rates in Selected Latin American Countries 





































































































































                  Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Correcting these distortions—high financial dollarization and the “peso problem”—will take 
a considerable length of time and will require the support of certain government policies. The 
institutional strengthening envisaged in the legal reform of central banks has been a major 
step in the right direction, complemented with the modernization of the design and execution 
of monetary policy and the implementation of policies aimed at building institutional 
capacity. However, central banks need to persevere in consolidating their reputation by - 31 - 
 
systematically meeting their inflation targets, on the basis of maintaining operational 
independence within long-term decision-making horizons, and enhancing accountability and 
transparency.  
 
In terms of government policies, strengthening prudential regulations applicable to foreign 
exchange transactions is crucial to reestablish an independent monetary policy. While a set of 
good practices is still nonexistent, a number of measures may be adopted with the aim of   
encouraging the use of local currency vis à vis the U.S. dollar or other foreign currency. For 
instance, rising capital requirements in light of increases in foreign currency loans will take 
its toll on bank shareholders and will discourage borrowing in foreign currency. Establishing 
differentiated insurance premiums—within deposit insurance systems—to penalize foreign 
currency deposits will also act as an incentive for de-dollarizing financial systems. 
Nevertheless, these measures could work provided they are adopted in an environment of 
macroeconomic stability. Other than these, de-dollarization efforts should be part of a broad 
strategy based on national consensus about economic, political, and social foundations for 
long-term stability and economic growth, which also seems to be necessary to restore 
confidence in domestic currencies. 
 
C.   How to Cope with Capital Inflows While Maintaining Policy Consistency 
Monetary policy consistency is instrumental to underpin credibility, a key pre-requisite to 
achieve long-run price stability. If markets are unable to anticipate and understand the 
decisions of central banks, and if central banks lack a consistent policy reaction function, 
monetary policy will be less effective in reducing inflation and the existence of an inflation 
bias will perpetuate. In this environment, monetary policy efforts directed to reduce inflation 
will demand higher interest rates than otherwise, which will imply a higher “sacrifice ratio.” 
 
Following the institutional reform of central banks, policy inconsistency decreased 
significantly in Latin America as political influence on central bank decisions was mostly 
eradicated. Nonetheless, while policy surprises associated to sudden monetary expansion 
became less important, inconsistencies remained in a few central banks, this time as a result 
of using the exchange rate as nominal anchor to reduce inflation. Central banks targeting the 
exchange rate tend to devote their energies to defend the exchange rate peg, which at times 
were in conflict with policies aimed at achieving price stability. 
 
The recent surge of capital inflows has put additional pressure on the consistency of 
monetary policy in the Latin American economies. As capital inflows soared, domestic 
currencies tend to appreciate, leading central banks to the dilemma of whether or not to 
intervene in the exchange rate market to avoid a real appreciation. The 2004–2005 oil supply 
shock has further complicated central banks’ policy response to capital inflows as it triggered 
a slight rebound in inflation in many countries. To keep inflation pressures—even if they are 
only moderate—from contaminating wage negotiations and other contracts, in many cases 
central banks have increased interest rates. However, higher interest rates have attracted 
additional capital inflows, thereby exacerbating appreciation pressures on the domestic - 32 - 
 
currencies. Similar issues have arisen in oil exporting countries in the region, given the 
significant increase in oil revenues as a result of the spike in crude prices.  
 
As oppose to the recent past, today the real appreciation of domestic currencies is not 
welcome any more. In 2004, most central banks in the region, including some of them 
working in an IT framework, have been intervening in the exchange market to mitigate real 
appreciation pressures.
41 At least two factors help to explain the opposition to accept today’s 
appreciation trend. The first is that inflation in the region is not perceived any more as a 
problem, and hence, the appreciation of the domestic currencies appears generating only 
costs but no benefits. The second factor is the loss of competitiveness of exports as today 
they face a fierce foreign competition, especially from Asia, which puts at risk investment 
and employment. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 8, a number of central banks—Colombia, Guatemala, and Peru are 
some examples in the region—have followed the course of exchange market intervention. As 
a result, international reserves held by the central bank, as well as the stock of central 
bank/government bonds have increased, leading to a negative impact on central banks’ 
income statements. In turn, a few central banks in the region decided not to intervene in 
2004, or they did it on limited amounts, like Brazil, Chile, and Mexico.
42  
 
None of these two policy alternatives is cost free, but probably central banks’ intervention is 
more costly in a long-term perspective. While foreign exchange interventions are not 
abnormal, even in IT emerging markets, the problem is really the reason behind such 
intervention. A frequent and/or abundant intervention may signal the purpose of preserving 
external competitiveness, and not simply, for instance, the desire of mitigating short-term 
episodes of exchange rate volatility. The nature of this intervention raises concerns about 
central banks caring about the competitiveness of exports—an objective not envisaged in 
central banks’ charter—which at times may be in contradiction with the objective of price 
stability. Moreover, one can question the de facto independence of monetary policy because 
central banks intervention may well respond to external pressures indirectly exerted—
through the government—by market participants, which lose with the appreciation of the 
domestic currency.
                                                 
41 Intervention has taken place not only by outright sales of international reserves, but also 
using financial instruments such as options and swaps. 
42 In 2005, however, Brazil has stepped up foreign exchange intervention to moderate 
exchange rate appreciation and strengthen its international reserves. - 33 - 
 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































         Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. - 34 - 
 
Furthermore, central banks’ intervention may be damaging from an institutional standpoint, 
in particular for IT central banks. Given that IT central banks in the region have publicly 
committed with price stability as their fundamental objective, switching to a policy of 
avoiding exchange rate appreciation may revive concerns about policy conflicts, as the 
appreciation would help to curb inflation pressures. Furthermore, switching short-term policy 
emphasis to focus on exchange rate stability will damage central banks’ predictability, a key 
feature in which central banks have made a valuable and sustained investment. 
 
On the other hand, when central banks do not intervene in the foreign currency market, the 
appreciation trend will eventually disappear, provided domestic interest rates adjust 
downward to eliminate differentials vis-à-vis the world interest rate. In the event that a real 
appreciation materializes, this may help to moderate inflation pressures stemming from the 
oil shock. On the other hand, to cope with the cost on tradable activities, domestic producers 
may have to absorb the losses.  In the long-run, central banks may not be very effective in 
containing the real appreciation because the real exchange rate is an endogenous variable. 
Thus, the appropriate way to mitigate the effects of the real appreciation is that tradable 
activities increase productivity. 
 
Current exogenous shocks stress the need of additional structural changes in Latin America, 
in particular in the labor market. Making the economies more flexible will allow them to 
better adjust to moderate the adverse effects of exogenous shocks. It may also allow to soften 
the cyclical pattern of the real exchange rate, which tend to evolve in the long-run through an 
equilibrium path (Figure 9). 
 
D.   The Perils of Financial System Weaknesses and the Lack of Fiscal Discipline 
While the objective of price stability is clearly a central bank responsibility, it may not be 
attainable and, in particular, may not be sustainable in the long-run, without the support of 
other conditions that are out of the scope of central banks. Two key threatens to the objective 
of price stability are potential financial system weaknesses and the persistent lack of fiscal 
discipline.
43 These two distortions can place an upward pressure to interest rates and 
eventually may trigger a rebound in inflation. 
 
The need to preserve sound financial systems 
 
Banking crises have been a common and recurrent event in Latin America with disastrous 
macroeconomic and social effects (Carstens et al., 2004). In particular, since 1990, banking 
crises have been the main cause of inflation reversals and economic contraction in a number 
of countries (see Figure 10). From a microeconomic perspective, in a number of episodes the 
management of systemic crises left a legacy of market discipline relaxation as a result of the  
                                                 
43 In this paper we are assuming that financial systems’ surveillance is not a central bank 
responsibility, like in the majority of countries in Latin America. - 35 - 
 
 
























































































































































































provision of blanket guarantees and widespread debt restructuring, while depositors' 
confidence suffered a long-term damage because of breaches of contracts such as freezing 
and reprogramming of deposits. 
 
Central banks in Latin America have been intensively involved in the management of 
banking crises and resolution, whether or not the crisis posed a systemic threat. The resulting 
monetization was not free of costs. On the contrary, it exacerbated macroeconomic 
instability, including in a number of cases a simultaneous banking and currency crisis. 
Central banks’ participation in bank resolution also damaged their financial position as a 
result of the purchase of assets—received in exchange for liquidity and solvency loans 
provided in the midst of the crises—which were very difficult to recover overtime. 
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              Source: International Financial Statistics, IMF. 
 
Most countries in the region have made progress in establishing an appropriate framework 
for preventing and managing banking crises, but more needs to be done. The new reforms 
must emphasize precautionary regulations because the experience shows that once a crisis 
erupts the costs are inexorably high. Thus, countries should focus on improving early 
warning mechanisms and, more important, on empowering bank regulators to act effectively 
at an early stage to deal with incipient banks liquidity and solvency problems.
44 In addition, 
                                                 
44 The experience of recent banking crises in Latin America shows that bank regulators tend 
to act when liquidity and solvency problems were already irreversible. - 37 - 
 
the legal framework for bank restructuring and resolution must be improved to allow 
countries to manage and resolve banking crises in an effective way. Major reforms and new 
procedures should facilitate and make more effective the conduct of “purchase and 
assumption” operations as the main instrument of bank resolution. The costs of the crisis 
should be absorbed by financial institutions’ shareholders and by large depositors, whereas 
any residual cost should be borne by the government and not by the central bank. 
 
As part of this reform, the role of central banks in the prevention and management of banking 
crises should be clearly established in law. Leaving open the door for the monetization of 
banking crises may threaten central banks’ objective of price stability and may pose moral 
hazard risks. Central banks may be under pressure to provide easy money to finance banking 
crises, in particular in countries that feature weak institutions, thereby amplifying 
macroeconomic instability. Having generous access to central bank resources is equivalent to 
providing leeway to bankers and depositors to take excessive risks. In turn, governments may 
feel encouraged to postpone banking resolution decisions as they count at any time on low 
cost funds from the central bank, without measuring properly the potential costs of delaying 
decisions aimed at adopting lasting bank resolution decisions. 
 
Regulations to restrict central banks’ involvement in banking crises must be integral part of 
the legal reform aimed at preventing and managing banking crises. Furthermore, once the 
regulations to manage banking crises and resolution are in place—based on the use of private 
sector and fiscal resources—legal provisions should be in effect to limit monetization of 
banking crises. Regarding lender-of-last-resort assistance, it should be bounded to short-term 
loans directed to illiquid but solvent banks. Restricting central banks’ participation in 
banking crises resolution and restructuring will limit macroeconomic instability.
45 
 
The importance of having strong public finances 
 
A second key potential source of vulnerability to price stability in Latin America is the 
reemergence of fiscal deficits. After an initial period of fiscal consolidation during the early 
1990s in most countries in the region, fiscal deficits—measured in terms of the ratio of the 
non-financial pubic sector deficit to GDP—have soared again in a number of countries (see 
Figure 11). While public expenditure financing from central banks is already restricted 
following the institutional reform of central banks, increasing fiscal deficits are conducive to 
a pick up in public debt as the only remaining source of government financing. 
 
                                                 
45 Jácome (2005) analyzes 20 episodes of banking crises in Latin America during the 1990s 
and 2000s and claims that when central banks monetized the crises macroeconomic 
instability was larger, and vice versa.  - 38 - 
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The effect of a lack of fiscal discipline and an increasing debt burden is that countries may 
feature high real interest rates and a surge in “country risk” indicators. A tight monetary 
policy combined with a loose fiscal stance produces an inconsistent policy mix, which leads 
to an upward trend in interest rates as central banks multiply efforts to preserve markets’ 
confidence on inflation targets. In an environment of high interest rates, the room of 
maneuver of monetary policy is limited and conducive to an enhanced “sacrifice ratio.” In 
the limit, the deteriorating fiscal stance may turn unsustainable, thereby leading to a currency 
crisis, like in Brazil in 1999, or to a banking-currency-sovereign debt crisis, like in Argentina 
en 2002. 
 
In light of a potential additional deterioration of public finances, a number of Latin American 
governments have the responsibility of reestablishing fiscal discipline to underpin central 
bank efforts to abate inflation. Central banks can do little to curb inflation expectations 
associated to large fiscal deficits and an unsustainable public debt, except rising interest 
rates—which may not be sustainable in the current juncture—as a way of alerting the 
markets about the perils of lax fiscal policies in relation to their medium and long-run 
objective of achieving price stability. An alternative course of action could be that 
governments approve “fiscal responsibility laws,” like those already enacted in countries like 
Brazil and Ecuador, which seems to be providing encouraging results. 
 
VI.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Recent major developments in monetary policy in Latin America are of an institutional 
nature. A major central bank reform was adopted in almost all countries in the region, which 
focused their mandate on seeking and preserving price stability, enhanced central banks’ 
autonomy, in particular, in the use of monetary instruments, and held them accountable with 
respect to the actions adopted to attain their policy mandate. Under this new institutional 
framework, monetary policy has modernized and inflation has dropped to single-digit rates in 
a majority of countries of the region. Empirical evidence indicates that the legal 
independence of central banks, in conjunction with other macroeconomic policies, has 
contributed to this result. 
 
Today, central banks need to address three important challenges. First, to drive inflation to 
international levels, as a measure of price stability, minimizing at the same time the “sacrifice 
rate” associated with the disinflation process. Second, to foster confidence in the domestic 
currencies, not only as a means of payment, but also as a store of value, to reduce the 
vulnerabilities stemming from dollarization and to enhance monetary policy’s room of 
maneuver. And third, to maintain the consistency of monetary policy in the wake of the new 
wave of capital inflows, which is fueled by a propitious international environment and 
attracted by improved stability conditions and favorable regional prospects. 
 
While an enhanced reputation and credibility will be key to successfully overcoming the first 
challenge—at least from the part of central banks—this may not be sufficient to restore 
confidence in the domestic currencies in a number of countries in the region. De-dollarization 
is expected to take place gradually as a result of maintaining solid macroeconomic - 40 - 
 
fundamentals and the adoption of microeconomic regulations aimed at discouraging 
transactions in foreign currency. Likewise, measures to weather distortions created by capital 
inflows also require a strategy that exceeds central bank responsibilities, given the political 
economy implications of the resulting appreciation trend of domestic currencies. Despite the 
short-term toll that a market solution may take on the competitiveness of tradables, it might 
be less costly in the long-run than the alternative of intervening in the foreign exchange 
market. The intervention strategy may damage the credibility of central banks, thereby 
potentially impairing further efforts to abate inflation. In addition, the sterilization of 
exchange rate interventions will imply an indirect subsidy to tradable activities resulting from 
the negative impact on central banks’ income statements, which could turn into a quasi-fiscal 
deficit. Alternatively, the short-term loss of competitiveness should be absorbed by 
producers, whereas governments should compensate the long-run loss of competitiveness via 
structural reforms to make the economies more flexible to cope with adverse shocks. 
 
In general, central banks will not succeed in their endeavors unless governments ensure 
global macroeconomic stability and the viability of countries. In particular, central banks 
success also hinges on governments’ abilities to preserve the soundness and stability of the 
financial systems and to keep fiscal deficits in check. Finally, governments should make sure 
that actions speak louder than words in supporting the autonomy of central banks, demanding 










Andersen, P., and W. Wascher, 1999, “Sacrifice Ratios and the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
in Conditions of Low Inflation,” BIS Working Papers, No. 82 (Basel: Bank for 
Internaitonal Settlements). 
 
Barro, R., and D. Gordon, 1983, “A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate 
Model,” Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 91, pp. 589–610. 
 
Brumm, H., 2000, “Inflation and Central Bank Independence: Conventional Wisdom 
Redux,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 32, pp. 807–19  (November). 
 
Bubula, A., and I. Ötker-Robe, 2002, “The Evolution of Exchange Rate Regimes since 1990: 
Evidence from De Facto Policies,” IMF Working Paper 02/155 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
 
Carare, A., A. Schaechter, M. Stone, and M. Zelmer, 2002, “Establishing Initial Conditions 
in Support of Inflation Targeting,” IMF Working Paper 02/102 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
 
Carstens, A., D. Hardy, and C. Pazarbaşioğlu, 2004, “Banking Crises in Latin America and 
the Political Economy of Financial Sector Policy.”  Document presented at the 
seminar Gobiernos y Bancos: Responsabilidades y Límites.  Inter-American 
Development Bank, Annual Meetings, Lima, Peru (March). 
 
Chortareas, G., D. Stasavage, and G. Sterne, 2002, “Monetary Policy Transparency, 
Inflation, and the Sacrifice Ratio,” International Journal of Finance and Economics, 
Vol. 7, pp. 141–155. 
 
Cukierman, A., 1992, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence: Theory and 
Evidence (Cambridge, Massachussetts: The MIT Press).  
 
———, P. Miller, and B. Neyapti, 2002, “Central Bank Reform, Liberalization, and Inflation 
in Transition Economies – An International Perspective,” Journal of Monetary 
Economics, Vol. 49, pp. 237–64. 
 
De Haan, J., and W. Kooi, 2000, “Does Central Bank Independence Really Matter? New 
Evidence for Developing Countries Using a New Indicator,” Journal of Banking and 
Finance, Vol. 24, pp. 643-64. 
 
De Nicoló. G., P. Honohan and A. Ize, 2005, “Dollarization of Bank Deposits: Causes and 
Consequences,” Journal of Banking and Finance, Vol. 29, pp. 1697-1727. 
 - 42 - 
 
Edwards, S., 1995, Crisis and Reform in Latin America: From Despair to Hope (Oxford and 
New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Eijffinger, S., and E. Schaling, 1993, “Central Bank Independence in Twelve Industrial 
Countries,” Banca Nazionale de Lavoro Quarterly Review, No. 184 (March), 
 pp.  49–89. 
 
———, E. Schaling, and M. Hoeberichts, 1998, “Central Bank Independence: A Sensitivity 
Analysis,” European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 14, pp. 73–88. 
 
Fischer, S., 2001, “Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?” Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Spring). 
 
______, 1995, Modern Central Banking. En Capie, F., et.al. Eds. The Future of Central 
Banking (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
 
Fischer, A.M., 1996, “Central Bank Independence and Sacrifice Ratios,” Open Economies 
Review, Vol. 7, pp. 5–18. 
 
Fuhrer, J., 1997, “Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary Policy 
Paradigms for the Next Millennium?” New England Economic Review, pp. 19–36 
(January/February). 
 
Grilli, V., D. Masciandaro, and G. Tabellini, 1991, “Political and Monetary Institutions and 
Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries,” Economic Policy: A European 
Forum, Vol. 6, pp. 342–91 (October). 
 
Gartner, M., 1997, “Central Bank Independence and the Sacrifice Ratio: The Dark Side of 
the Force,” Schweizerische Zeitschrift fur Wolkswirtschaft und Statistik, No. 133,    
pp. 513–38 (September). 
 
Jácome, L., 2005, “Central Banks Involvement in Banking Crises and Resolution in Latin 
America: Not a Free Lunch,” forthcoming IMF Working Paper, (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund). 
 
______ 2003, “Independencia Legal de la Banca Central en la América Latina e Inflación,” 
El Trimestre Económico, Vol. LXX(4), pp. 673–719, Mexico, D.F (October- 
December). 
 
———, and F. Vázquez, 2005, “Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence and 
Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean” IMF Working Paper 
05/75, (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
 
Kydland, F., and E. Prescott, 1977, “Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of the 
Optimal Plans,” Journal of Political Economy, 85, pp. 473–491. - 43 - 
 
 
Lora, E., 2001, “Structural Reforms in Latin America: What Has Been Reformed and How to 
Measure It,” Research Department Working Paper No. 466, (Washington: 
Inter-American Development Bank).  
 
Loungani, P., and N. Sheets, 1997, “Central Bank Independence, Inflation, and Growth in 
Transition Economies,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, Vol. 29, No. 3, 
pp. 381–99 (August). 
 
Rogoff, K., 1985, “The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary 
Target,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1169–1190 (November). 
 
Sarel, M., 1996, “Nonlinear Effects of Inflation on Economic Growth,” Staff Papers, 
International Monetary Fund, Vol. 43, pp. 199–215 (March). 
 
Siklos, P., 2002, The Changing Face of Central Banking: Evolutionary Trends Since World 
War II  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Truman, E., 2003, Inflation Targeting in the World Economy, Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
 
 
 